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Abstract
By adopting signaling theory as the overarching framework and integrating selfdetermination theory, we examined the signaling function of task i-deals, financial i-deals, and
their interaction. Across three studies with varying measures, we found that task i-deals,
independently and jointly with financial i-deals, conveyed a positive message regarding
competence in that they were positively related to recipients’ competence need satisfaction. In
turn, competence need satisfaction positively related to organizational citizenship behaviors. The
competence-signaling function of task i-deals and task-financial i-deals interaction remained
significant even after accounting for leader-member exchange, organization-based self-esteem,
and perceived organizational support. Financial i-deals, however, did not exhibit a competencesignaling function. The current research sheds light on the signaling function of i-deals and their
interaction, and provides guidance on the practice of granting one or multiple types of i-deals.

Keywords
Idiosyncratic deals, signaling theory, competence need satisfaction, organizational citizenship
behavior, social exchange, organization-based self-esteem
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Examining the Signaling Function of Idiosyncratic Deals and Their Interaction
As organizations continue to strive toward attracting and retaining top talent, attention
has increasingly focused on the provision of non-standard, idiosyncratic deals (i-deals) to
employees as a way for organizations to distinguish themselves from other employers, as well as
to enhance employee performance and loyalty. Since the seminal work by Rousseau (2005),
research has demonstrated that i-deals are granted with at least moderate frequency in different
organizations across multiple industries, and that such i-deals can lead to enhanced attitudinal
and behavioral outcomes, including job satisfaction, organizational commitment, task
performance, and organizational citizenship behaviors (e.g., Anand, Vidyarthi, Liden, &
Rousseau, 2010; Ho & Tekleab, 2013; Hornung, Rousseau, & Glaser, 2009; Hornung, Rousseau,
Weig, Müller, & Glaser, 2014; Liu, Lee, Hui, Kwan, & Wu, 2013).
Reflecting the idiosyncratic nature of such deals, prior works have also found that the
content of i-deals can vary, whereby content refers to the particular resources that the i-deals
encompass (Rousseau, Ho, & Greenberg, 2006). For instance, Rousseau and colleagues
(Hornung, Rousseau, Glaser, Angerer, & Weigl, 2010; Rousseau & Kim, 2006) found, in the
context of hospitals, four types of i-deals pertaining to scheduling flexibility (flexibility i-deals),
workload reduction, developmental opportunities (developmental i-deals), and the nature of work
tasks and responsibilities (task i-deals). More recently, Rosen, Slater, Chang, and Johnson (2013)
introduced an updated typology that captures i-deals commonly negotiated across multiple
employment settings beyond hospitals. While three of these forms replicate the earlier ones
(scheduling flexibility, location flexibility, task/work responsibilities), a new form—financial ideal—was introduced, capturing compensation arrangements that fit individual needs.
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A key premise underlying i-deals theory is that different forms of i-deals convey different
messages to employees, such that employees respond differently depending on the content of
their i-deals (Rousseau et al., 2006). While some i-deals are indicative of a high-quality social
exchange relationship with the organization and may enhance employee motivation, others
convey a more economic transaction and may be less effective in motivating employees
(Hornung et al., 2009; Rousseau, Hornung, & Kim, 2009). This suggests that different i-deals not
only convey different messages, but also may not necessarily engender reciprocity from
employees. Thus, researchers have noted that “social exchange theory arguments are insufficient
in explaining the process” linking i-deals and employee outcomes, and called for theory-building
that expands the set of explanatory mechanisms beyond the conventional social exchange
perspective that has dominated i-deals research (Liao, Wayne, & Rousseau, in press, p. 6).
The present research takes a step toward doing so by integrating signaling theory and
self-determination theory (SDT) to examine the competence-signaling, motivational mechanism
underlying i-deals. Specifically, our research objective is to explore how two very distinct forms
of i-deals (financial and task i-deals) can drive recipients’ discretionary organizational
citizenship behaviors (OCB) by fulfilling their competence need, over and beyond the more
commonly examined social exchange mechanisms. We focus on task and financial i-deals
because their very different nature provides for greater scope to compare the competencesignaling, motivational potential underlying i-deals. Specifically, while task i-deal represents an
abstract and non-monetizable form of i-deal, financial i-deal constitutes a more concrete and
monetizable form (Rousseau et al., 2006), thereby suggesting that they are likely to convey
different messages to employees. Furthermore, their conceptual distinctiveness raises the
question of whether the competence-enhancing signal conveyed by each i-deal will be reinforced
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or diminished when both occur concurrently. In examining the meta-feature (Bowen & Ostroff,
2004) of i-deals in terms of how internal consistency between different i-deals may alter their
motivational potential, we offer a richer, more nuanced view of such deals.
Building on signaling theory (Connelly, Certo, Ireland, & Reutzel, 2011; Spence, 1973)
as an overarching framework to examine how task and financial i-deals independently and
jointly drive employees’ OCB, this study is the first to explicitly investigate the signals conveyed
by i-deals, a notion that was first advanced by Rousseau and colleagues (2006), who noted that ideals “can signal [to their recipients] the value an employer places on [them]” (p. 979). At the
same time, while signaling theory provides the logic for how i-deals can convey positive
messages to employees, it does not articulate the specific mechanisms through which such
messages translate into enhanced behavioral responses. Thus, we use self-determination theory
(SDT; Deci & Ryan, 1985; Ryan & Deci, 2000), a well-established contemporary theory of
motivation, to explicate how the signals from i-deals can enhance individuals’ competence need
satisfaction and, in turn, OCB.
Our study contributes to extant research on i-deals in three ways. First, we push beyond
the dominant perspectives in i-deals theory, primarily social exchange theory (in the form of
leader-member exchange and perceived organizational support) (e.g., Anand et al., 2010) and
self-enhancement perspective (Liu et al., 2013), to introduce a signaling function of i-deals,
thereby advancing i-deals theory. Second, we delineate the role of financial i-deals, a relatively
under-investigated form of i-deals, by examining how they not only relate to OCB but also
moderate the signaling function of task i-deals, thereby expanding the limited body of work on
financial i-deals. In particular, the fact that the only two existing studies (Ho and Tekleab, 2013;
Rosen et al., 2013) examining financial i-deals revealed inconsistent findings on their attitudinal

I-Deals Interaction 6
outcomes underscores the need to further investigate whether financial i-deals can elicit indeed
positive employee outcomes. Our third contribution pertains to demonstrating that different
forms of i-deals can operate jointly to shape employee responses, over and above the role that
each form of i-deals may independently play. In so doing, we go beyond prior i-deals research
that has primarily examined individual forms of i-deals in isolation. Investigating the interactive
role that i-deals can play offers a richer, more accurate perspective of how i-deals function, in
that employees’ reactions to one form of i-deals may be contingent on the level of another form
of i-deals. This also addresses researchers’ calls to enrich signaling theory by investigating how
signalers can manage a portfolio of signals, rather than each individually, so to maximize their
collective effectiveness (Connelly et al., 2011), thereby paving the way for further research on
the meta-features of i-deals.
We adopt a three-study approach to provide robust support for our model and enhance the
validity of our findings. In Study 1, we conduct a field study to examine the relationships that
task and financial i-deals have, independently and jointly, with competence need satisfaction,
which in turn facilitates coworker-reported OCB. We include leader-member exchange (LMX)
as a control mediating mechanism to demonstrate the robustness of competence need satisfaction
as a mediating mechanism above and beyond the leader-member social exchange mechanism. In
Study 2, we replicate the findings from the previous study while also including organizationbased self-esteem (OBSE) as a control mediating mechanism, so as to account for the selfenhancement explanation. In the final field study (Study 3), we replicate our findings from the
previous two studies while controlling for perceived organizational support (POS) as another
alternative mediator.
I-Deals as Signaling Devices
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We advance a novel view of i-deals as signaling devices that can explain how i-deals
predict employee outcomes. Originally proposed by Spence (1973) to explain how education
conveys otherwise unobservable qualities of job candidates to potential employers, signaling
theory addresses information asymmetry between two parties (e.g., employer and employee;
executives and investors), one of whom has access to information about one’s quality and/or
intent that the other party does not, and focuses on how the former can communicate such
information to the latter through various signals so as to elicit certain desirable responses from
the latter. Signaling theory has been used to explain various phenomena, including how brand
managers use advertising to signal the quality of their products and services to consumers (e.g.,
Chung & Kalnins, 2001), how negotiators use offers and counteroffers to signal their willingness
to agree on a particular outcome (e.g., Srivastava, 2001), and how employers use various types of
employment practices (e.g., recruitment strategies; pay-for-performance1 incentive plans) to
signal their intent to potential and existing employees (e.g., Belogolovsky & Bamberger, 2014;
Rynes, 1991). In the specific context of i-deals research, scholars have also alluded to the
signaling function of i-deals by noting the i-deals can convey positive signals in the employment
relationship and serve as powerful cues (e.g., Rousseau et al., 2006, 2009; Rousseau & Kim,
2006).
Several features of signaling theory underscore its relevance to the current focus on ideals as signaling devices. As elaborated on by Connelly and colleagues (2011), the key
elements in signaling theory comprise (1) the signaler (e.g., employer) who possesses private
information about an organization, individual, or products that is not available to outsiders; (2)
the receiver (e.g., employee), an outsider who does not have, but wishes to access, such
information; and (3) the signal (e.g., i-deals), consisting of actions that the signaler takes to
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intentionally convey the information to the receiver. The use of signals is especially important in
the presence of information asymmetry, and in an employment relationship, the employer
generally has more information about the employee’s value to the organization relative to all
other workers. As such, the employer may “attempt to communicate or ‘signal’ certain
information to their underinformed exchange partners, hoping that, by reducing uncertainty on
the part of the underinformed, they can elicit behavior more favorable to themselves (the more
informed)” (Belogolovsky & Bamberger 2014, p. 1709). Additionally, because signaling theory
“focuses primarily on the deliberate communication of positive information in an effort to
convey positive organizational attributes” (Connelly et al., 2011, p. 44), signals have to be
observable and communicable to receivers in order to be effective (Connelly et al., 2011). The
effectiveness of signaling also hinges on whether receivers accurately interpret the intended
message (Belogolovsky & Bamberger, 2014; Connelly et al., 2011). One cause of inaccurate
interpretations is signal inconsistency, defined as the internal inconsistency among multiple
signals from one source (Gao, Darroch, Mather, & MacGregor, 2008), which then evokes
cognitive dissonance and negative reactions among signal recipients (Bowen & Ostroff, 2004).
Thus, to the extent that multiple signals are consistent, they are more likely to be effective.
Together, these features underscore the role of i-deals as signals that can be used by the
employer (the signaler) to convey its positive evaluation and regard for selected employees (the
receiver) in order to elicit desirable behavioral responses that benefit the former. Specifically,
because the provision of such work arrangements falls under the organization’s discretion, the
employer has deliberate control over the amount and form of i-deals to provide to effectively
signal its intention. The fact that i-deals are clearly observable from the recipients’ standpoint
further underscores the signaling function they can play. In addition, because i-deals are
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designed to fit individuals’ skills, interests, or needs, they are likely to elicit positive employee
attitudes and behaviors that will benefit the signaler, a feature that effective signals should have.
Last of all, the fact that i-deals can take on different forms introduces the potential for signals
conveyed through i-deals to be consistent with or conflict each other, thereby emphasizing the
relevance of signaling theory in predicting how different forms of i-deals may operate
independently and jointly to elicit positive employee behaviors.
I-Deals as Signal of Employee Competence
While prior research and the previous section proposed that i-deals can serve as signals,
the specific nature of such signals has yet to be explicated. Drawing from Rousseau et al.’s
(2006) observation that i-deals “are predicated on an individual worker’s value to his or her
employer” (Rousseau et al., 2006, p. 978) and, accordingly, signal the organization’s recognition
of such value, we contend that the signals conveyed by i-deals are, at least in part, competencerelated. This derives from the fact that employees provide value to the organization primarily
through their competence in discharging their work responsibilities. In other words, the provision
of i-deals signals the organization’s recognition of the recipients’ work competence, thereby
enhancing their competence need satisfaction and, subsequently, OCB.
Competence need, defined as individuals’ need to feel effective in interacting with and
mastering the environment so as to bring about desired outcomes and manage various challenges
(Deci & Ryan, 2000; Van den Broeck, Vansteenkiste, De Witte, & Lens, 2008), represents an
innate, universal psychological need that all individuals have, the satisfaction of which not only
promotes psychological health but also allows individuals to thrive in changing environments
(Gagné & Deci, 2005; Van den Broeck, Vansteenkiste, De Witte, Soenens, & Lens, 2010). While
seemingly comparable to constructs such as self-efficacy, which pertains to “acquired cognitions
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with respect to one’s capacities to successfully accomplish specific future tasks” (Van den
Broeck et al., 2010, p. 982), competence need has been distinguished from these constructs by
virtue of it being an innate need. Thus, an individual can be highly self-efficacious about
completing future tasks but yet perceive that the existing work context has failed to fulfill his/her
competence need (e.g., because work assignments are not challenging).
Consistent with the proposition in SDT that socio-contextual factors are important in
fulfilling psychological needs (e.g., Gagné & Deci, 2005), we propose that i-deals can signal
employees’ competence, thereby satisfying their competence need. Specifically, task i-deals are
designed to enable employees to capitalize on their skills, abilities, and knowledge at work (i.e.,
their work competence), and are thus likely to convey strong signals about the organization’s
recognition of the recipient’s competence. By granting such an i-deal to employees, the employer
indicates that it not only recognizes their competence and skill sets, but also values them to the
extent of reconfiguring their work tasks so as to better utilize such skill sets. Thus, employees
who are granted task i-deals are likely to receive a positive message regarding their competence
such that they will experience competence need satisfaction.
Hypothesis 1 (H1): Task i-deals are positively related to competence need satisfaction.
On the other hand, while financial i-deals may also convey positive, competence-related
messages to recipients, we expect the signal to be weaker and more equivocal than that from task
i-deals. According to cognitive evaluation theory (CET), a sub-theory of SDT (Ryan & Deci,
2000), external tangible rewards can decrease intrinsic motivation in general, but can also, under
certain conditions, accentuate intrinsic motivation (Deci et al., 1999). To explain these mixed
findings, SDT researchers propose that extrinsic rewards can convey mixed or different
messages (e.g., Deci, Eghrari, Patrick, & Leone, 1994; Ryan, Mims, & Koestner, 1983). On one
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hand, receiving such rewards can serve an informational function by signaling recipients’
competence, thereby enhancing their competence need satisfaction and motivation (Ryan et al.,
1983). On the other hand, rewards can also be seen as a form of organizational control to
implicitly pressure employees to act or think in specified ways (Ryan et al., 1983), and as a way
for the organization to reduce potential moral hazard and opportunistic behaviors on the
employees’ part (Connelly et al., 2011), thereby diminishing their motivation.
While empirical evidence is lacking on which signal is more strongly conveyed by
financial i-deals, researchers have recently noted that rewards that are indirectly performancesalient, that is, rewards that are not directly or clearly tied to performance (e.g., base salaries), are
less likely to be deemed as controlling one’s behavior (Cerasoli, Nicklin, & Ford, 2014). In
contrast, rewards that are directly performance-salient, that is, those with a clear and proximal
link to performance (e.g., sales commissions), are more likely to be associated with controlling
behavior (Cerasoli et al., 2014). Because financial i-deals are not directly tied to specific levels
or criteria of work performance, they constitute indirectly performance-salient incentives that are
less likely to play a controlling function, thereby suggesting that the competence-signaling
function will operate to some extent. Thus, we expect that financial i-deals will convey a weaker
but nonetheless positive competence-related signal to recipients, thereby enhancing their
competence need satisfaction.
Hypothesis 2 (H2): Financial i-deals are positively related to competence need
satisfaction.
In turn, SDT prescribes that the satisfaction of psychological needs, which encompass
competence needs, will yield positive employee behaviors such as task performance and OCB
(Gagné & Deci, 2005). This also follows directly from the contention in signaling theory that
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signals are intended to elicit positive behaviors that benefit the signaler. In the present research,
we focus on OCB, defined as employee behaviors that are relatively discretionary but
nonetheless contribute to effective organizational functioning (Organ, 1997), because as a
discretionary, extra-role behavioral outcome, OCB is particularly suited to capture employees’
voluntary responses to i-deals. In contrast, in-role task performance is mandated by the
organization and, consequently, may exhibit less variability in response to i-deals. Focusing on
OCB also allows us to extend prior research that used a social exchange perspective to examine
how i-deals facilitate OCB (Anand et al., 2010), by investigating competence need satisfaction as
another viable mediator in the i-deals-to-OCB relationship.
Competence need satisfaction can enhance employees’ perceived ability as well as
motivation to engage in OCB. To the extent that competence need satisfaction bolsters
individuals’ confidence in their work abilities, it will increase their perceived ability to go
beyond in-role responsibilities to engage in discretionary behaviors that help coworkers and/or
the organization (Gagné & Deci, 2005; Rosen, Ferris, Brown, Chen, & Yan, 2014). Further,
employees whose competence need is satisfied tend to be more engaged and intrinsically
motivated to excel at work (Greguras & Diefendorff, 2010; Van den Broeck et al., 2008), with
such drive for excellence manifesting in OCB. Accordingly, in line with extant evidence of a
positive linkage between overall psychological need satisfaction and OCB (e.g., Greguras &
Diefendorff, 2010; Rosen et al., 2014), competence need satisfaction is also expected to relate
positively to OCB. Overall, integrating this relationship with the previous set of hypotheses leads
us to expect that competence need satisfaction will mediate the positive linkages that both task
and financial i-deals are predicted to have with OCB.

I-Deals Interaction 13
Hypothesis 3 (H3): Competence need satisfaction mediates the relationship between task
i-deals and OCB.
Hypothesis 4 (H4): Competence need satisfaction mediates the relationship between
financial i-deals and OCB.
I-Deals Interaction and Signal Consistency
Because signals do not operate in isolation but, instead, “may vary as a function of
signals inferred from other related management policies or practices” (Belogolovsky &
Bamberger, 2014, p. 1708), we argue that task and financial i-deals will interact with each other
to predict OCB, and that this relationship is again mediated by competence need satisfaction.
This argument derives from the notion of signal consistency, reflecting the extent of agreement
between multiple signals from one source (Connelly et al., 2011). To the extent that a signal is
reinforced by, and consistent with, signals conveyed through other organizational mechanisms,
the former is likely to become stronger and less ambiguous. In particular, weak signals can serve
as a framework against which stronger signals are interpreted, such that when weak signals are
inconsistent with strong signals, the strength of the latter will be diminished (Belogolovsky &
Bamberger, 2014).
Extending this to the context of task and financial i-deals, we expect that financial i-deals,
despite being a weaker competence-signaling device, can alter the signal strength of task i-deals.
Specifically, while task i-deals are expected to be positive related to employees’ competence
need satisfaction, we contend that this link will be accentuated to the extent that the employees
also receive financial i-deals. When both forms of i-deals “complement one another and fit
together as a whole” (Bowen & Ostroff, 2004, p. 211), their competence-enhancing signals can
be mutually reinforcing such that combined, they send a particularly strong and consistent
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message that enhances employees’ competence need satisfaction. However, if employees who
receive task i-deals do not also get financial i-deals, this inconsistency in i-deal arrangements
could diminish the clarity of the competence-enhancing signal conveyed by task i-deals, thereby
prompting a discounting of that signal and weakening the efficacy of task i-deals in satisfying
employees’ competence need.
Hypothesis 5 (H5): Financial i-deals moderate the relationship between task i-deals and
competence need satisfaction, such that the relationship is stronger as financial i-deals
increase.
Integrating Hypothesis 5 with previous arguments regarding the link between competence
need and OCB also leads us to propose the following mediated-moderation hypothesis:
Hypothesis 6 (H6): Competence need satisfaction mediates the relationship between taskfinancial i-deals interaction and OCB.
Overview of Present Research
We conducted three field studies to test our hypotheses. In Study 1, we provide first
evidence on the competence-signaling function of i-deals and their interaction, while including
LMX, representing leader-member social exchange, as a simultaneous mediator in order to
demonstrate the robust mediating role of competence need satisfaction. To reduce the threat of
common-source and common-method bias, we use coworker-rated OCB. Study 2 is another field
study that replicates the findings while including OBSE as a simultaneous mediator. Finally,
Study 3 replicates the findings while including POS as a simultaneous mediator, and adding the
variable of social desirability and a marker variable (Siemsen, Roth, and Oliveira, 2010) to
address methodological issues. Across the three studies, we include different control variables
that collectively represent alternative mediating mechanisms that have been previously
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established, so as to provide robust support for our hypotheses. Table 1 displays the hypotheses
tested and the corresponding results in each study.
Study 1
Methods
Participants. A total of 131 employee-coworker dyads recruited through the
StudyResponse Project completed this study. StudyResponse is a non-profit organization that
recruits participants for academic research, and offers them monetary compensation in exchange
for completing online surveys. StudyResponse has been frequently used in prior management
research related to i-deals (Ng & Feldman, 2015) and other topics (e.g., Kong & Ho, 2015;
Triana, Garcia, & Collela, 2010; Umphress, Bingham, & Mitchell, 2010). As recommended by
Podsakoff, MacKenzie, and Podsakoff (2012), we collected data over two sessions separated by
approximately a month so as to procedurally reduce common method bias.
Two hundred and one respondents completed the survey at Time 1, and after an average
of 25 days, 150 of them completed the survey at Time 2, resulting in a retention rate of 74.6%.
Respondents were also asked to invite a coworker to participate in the study, and the invited
coworker then completed the participant signup, which was verified by StudyResponse. Out of
the 150 matched coworker dyads, we eliminated 19 dyads in which (1) one of the dyad members
had changed the organization or supervisor by the second survey; or (2) both dyad members
were not working under the same supervisor. This yielded a final sample of 131 focal
participants (28% female) paired with their respective coworkers. We checked the quality of the
data by looking for patterned responses and reviewing the time used to complete the survey, and
did not detect any observations that were problematic. The average age of the focal participants
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was 41.70 years (SD = 10.46) and average organizational tenure was 88.34 months (SD = 68.81).
About 95% of them had at least some college education.
Measures. Focal participants completed the measures of task and financial i-deals and
demographics at Time 1, and the competence need satisfaction and LMX measures at Time 2.
Their coworkers rated their OCB and task performance at Time 2. All variables were assessed on
a seven-point scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree) unless otherwise
indicated.
I-deals. Participants rated their task and financial i-deals using the eleven items from
Rosen et al.’s (2013) scales of task and work responsibilities (6 items; α = .89) and financial
incentives (5 items; α = .92). A sample item of task i-deals is “At my request, my supervisor has
assigned me tasks that better develop my skills,” and a sample item of financial i-deals is “At my
initial appointment, I negotiated with my supervisor to develop a compensation plan that rewards
my unique contributions.”
Competence need satisfaction. Participants indicated their competence need satisfaction
by responding to Brien et al.’s (2012) four items (α = .90). Sample items include “I have the
ability to do my work well” and “I feel competent at work.”
LMX. Participants indicated their LMX by responding to Bernerth, Armenakis, Field,
Giles, and Walker’s (2007) eight items (α = .91). Sample items include “My supervisor and I
have a two-way exchange relationship” and “My relationship with my supervisor is composed of
comparable of exchanges of giving and taking.”
OCB and task performance. Coworkers rated respective focal participants’ OCB using
Lee and Allen’s (2002) 16 items (α = .96). Sample items are “This person helps others who have
been absent” and “This person takes action to protect the organization from potential problems.”
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As a supplementary measure, coworkers also rated respective focal participants’ task
performance using Podsakoff and MacKenzie’s (1989) six items, which include “This person
fulfills all the responsibilities required by his/her job.” Two reverse-scored items (“This person
often completes tasks in an unsatisfactory manner” and “This person often fails to perform
essential duties”) had low factor loading scores (below |0.40|) and were dropped; the remaining
four items were used to measure task performance (α = .89).
Control variables. We included gender (1 = female, 0 = male), age, organizational tenure
(in months), education (1 = Bachelor’s degree or above, 0 = under Bachelor’s degree), and
organizational status (1 = entry level, 2 = intermediate level, 3 = middle management level, 4 =
upper management level, 5 = executive level) as control variables, based on prior research
documenting the links between these and our outcome variable (e.g., Kidder & McLean Parks,
2001; Ng & Feldman, 2009).
Results
Measurement model. We conducted confirmatory factor analyses (CFAs) in LISREL
8.80 (Jöreskog & Sörbom, 2006) to distinguish among task i-deals, financial i-deals, competence
need satisfaction, LMX, OCB, and task performance by comparing the proposed six-factor
model to various (more parsimonious) five-factor models (Anderson & Gerbing, 1988). Because
the ratio of the sample size to the number of observed indicators was below 5 (Kline, 2005), we
followed previous research (e.g., Grant, Berg, & Cable, 2014) and used item parceling to
generate a better ratio of sample size to parameters, increase the reliability of latent variables,
and improve model fit (Little, Cunningham, Shahar, & Widaman, 2002). We formed two parcels
of task i-deal items based on item order (i.e., the first three items as the first parcel and the
second three items as the second parcel). A similar approach was used to form parcels of
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financial i-deals (two parcels), competence need satisfaction (two parcels), OCB (six parcels),
LMX (three parcels), and task performance (two parcels). All the indicators loaded onto their
respective latent variables, each with a factor loading score of above |.40|. Results indicated that
the six-factor model fit the data reasonably well (χ2 = 176.82, df = 104, CFI = .99, SRMR = .04,
RMSEA = .07) and had a better fit than any of the five-factor models (Δχ2s ≥ 66.44, dfs = 5, ps
< .001, ΔCFIs ≥ .02) (see Hu & Bentler, 1999; Kline, 2005 for the recommended cutoff values of
the fit indices). We also conducted a follow-up targeted CFA to test the distinctiveness of task
and financial i-deals, and the result indicated that the two-factor model fit the data better than the
one-factor model (Δχ2 = 30.45, df = 1, p < .001).
Hypothesis testing. Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics and correlations. The
inclusion of gender, age, organizational tenure, education, and organizational status did not
change the result patterns; consequently, these control variables were excluded from subsequent
analyses for the sake of parsimony. We conducted a path analysis to show the final model with
all the key variables included (see Figure 1), and the model fit the data well: χ2 = 14.16, df = 3,
GFI = .97, CFI = .97, NFI = .97, SRMR = .05.
We tested H1 through H6 using Hayes’s (2013) PROCESS algorithm with 1,000replication bootstrapping, which provided bootstrap 90% bias-corrected confidence interval
(CI90%). To test H1 through H4, we used PROCESS Diagram 4 and included LMX as a mediator
together with competence need satisfaction. The results indicated that task i-deals were
positively related to competence need satisfaction (b = .32, SE = .07, p < .001), as predicted in
H1. At the same time, task i-deals were positively related to LMX (b = .49, SE = .06, p < .001).
A separate analysis showed that financial i-deals were not significantly related to competence
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need satisfaction (b = .07, SE = .06, p = .18), thereby failing to support H2; however, financial ideals were positively related to LMX (b = .21, SE = .05, p < .001).
In terms of mediators, while LMX was a significant mediator for both task i-deals
(indirect effect = .20, bootstrap SE = .07, CI90% [.11, .33]) and financial i-deals (indirect effect
= .10, bootstrap SE = .04, CI90% [.05, .17]), competence need satisfaction was also a significant
mediator in the relationship between task i-deals and OCB (indirect effect = .10, bootstrap SE
= .04, CI90% [.04, .18]). However, competence need satisfaction did not mediate the relationship
between financial i-deals and OCB (indirect effect = .03, bootstrap SE = .02, CI90% [-.002, .07]).
Accordingly, H3 was supported whereas H4 was not.
To test H5, we used PROCESS Diagram 1 and found that task-financial i-deals
interaction was positively related to competence need satisfaction (b = .11, SE = .05, p < .05) and
LMX (b = .08, SE = .04, p < .05). As depicted in Figure 2a, task i-deals were more strongly
related to competence need satisfaction when financial i-deals were high (+1 SD) (simple effect
= .78, SE = .14, t = 5.63, p < .001) versus low (-1 SD) (simple effect = .46, SE = .12, t = 3.92, p
< .001), thereby supporting H5. A similar pattern was found for LMX: task i-deals were more
strongly related to LMX when financial i-deals were high (+1 SD) (simple effect = .79, SE = .12,
t = 6.63, p < .001) versus low (-1 SD) (simple effect = .57, SE = .10, t = 5.59, p < .001) (see
Figure 2b). To test H6, we used PROCESS Diagram 8 and simultaneously included LMX as a
(non-significant) mediator (indirect effect = .03, bootstrap SE = .03, CI90% [-.001, .09]). Results
indicated that competence need satisfaction mediated the relationship between task-financial ideals interaction and OCB (indirect effect = .04, bootstrap SE = .02, CI90% [.01, .07]), supporting
H6.
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Finally, as supplementary tests, we repeated the above analyses while also including task
performance as a covariate predicting OCB, and the pattern of results remained the same. We
also assessed the proposed model with task performance as the outcome variable, and results
indicated that while LMX was a non-significant mediator, competence need satisfaction
mediated the relationships that task and financial i-deals as well as their interaction had with task
performance.
Discussion
In this study, we found support for all the hypotheses except for H2 and H4, suggesting
that task i-deals and task-financial i-deals interaction indeed have a competence-signaling
function, even when the mediating role of LMX was simultaneously considered. However,
financial i-deals appeared to have no significant competence-signaling function. These findings
suggest that the perspective of leader-member social exchange cannot fully explain the
implications of task i-deals and task-financial i-deals interaction for OCB (or task performance).
In the next study, we account for the self-enhancement explanation provided by Liu et al. (2013)
by considering the mediating role of OBSE. In so doing, we provide a more rigorous test of the
added value that competence need satisfaction offers as a focal mediating mechanism, and
demonstrate the robust signaling function of task i-deals and task-financial i-deals interaction,
above and beyond self-enhancement.
Study 2
Methods
Participants. A different sample of 126 employees recruited through the StudyResponse
Project completed this study. As in Study 2, we collected data over two sessions separated by
approximately a month. One hundred and fifty three respondents completed the survey at Time
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1, and after an average of 34 days, 126 of them completed the survey at Time 2, resulting in a
retention rate of 82.4%. However, nine participants had changed their organizations or
supervisors by the second survey, and one participant did not respond to most of the questions.
These ten participants were excluded, leaving a final sample of 116 employees (49% female),
with an average age of 34.3 years (SD = 6.9). Almost all of them (99%) had at least some college
education.
Measures. Participants completed the measures of task and financial i-deals, competence
need satisfaction, OBSE, and demographic control variables at Time 1 and OCB at Time 2. Task
i-deals (α = .87), financial i-deals (α = .91), OCB (α = .92), and the control variables were
assessed with the same items in Study 1, except that organizational tenure was measured in years
rather than months. All variables were assessed on a five-point scale ranging from 1 (strongly
disagree) to 5 (strongly agree) unless otherwise indicated.
Competence need satisfaction. Participants indicated their competence need satisfaction
by responding to the three items of Spreitzer’s (1995) competence scale (e.g., “I have mastered
the skills necessary for my job”) (α = .79).
OBSE. Participants indicated their OBSE by responding to seven items adapted from
Liang, Farh, and Farh (2012) (e.g., “I am valuable around here”) (α = .88).
Results
Measurement model. We again conducted CFAs to evaluate the measurement model
and assess the distinction among the five key variables by comparing the five-factor model to
various (more parsimonious) four-factor models. We parceled the items of task i-deals (two
parcels), financial i-deals (two parcels), OBSE (three parcels), and OCB (six parcels). Due to the
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insufficient number of competence need satisfaction items for parceling, we did not form a
parcel for this variable.
All the indicators loaded onto their respective latent variables, each with a factor loading
score of above |.40|. The five-factor model fit the data reasonably well (χ2 = 206.30, df = 94, CFI
= .96, SRMR = .08, RMSEA = .10) and had a better fit than any of the four-factor models (Δχ2s
≥ 32.62, dfs = 4, ps < .001, ΔCFIs ≥ .01). A follow-up targeted CFA also indicated that the two ideals variables were distinct, with a two-factor model (task versus financial i-deals) fitting the
data better than a one-factor model (Δχ2 = 23.58, df = 1, p < .001).
Hypothesis testing. Table 3 presents the descriptive statistics, correlations, and alphas
(internal consistency). As in Study 1, the inclusion of gender, age, organizational tenure,
education, and organizational status did not change the result patterns, and these control
variables were excluded from subsequent analyses for the sake of parsimony. We conducted a
path analysis to show the final model with all the key variables included (see Figure 3), and the
model fit the data well (χ2 = 11.43, df = 3, GFI = .97, CFI = .97, NFI = .96, SRMR = .06).
We again tested H1 through H6 using Hayes’s (2013) PROCESS algorithm with 1,000replication bootstrapping. The first four hypotheses were tested using PROCESS Diagram 4 and
included OBSE and competence need satisfaction as simultaneous mediators. Consistent with
Study 1, task i-deals were positively related to competence need satisfaction (b = .22, SE = .08, p
< .01), again supporting H1, and to OBSE (b = .26, SE = .07, p < .001). A separate analysis
indicated that financial i-deals were not significantly related to competence need satisfaction (b
= .09, SE = .06, p = .17), thereby failing to support H2, but were positively related to OBSE (b
= .11, SE = .06, p = .05).
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As predicted in H3, competence need satisfaction mediated the relationship between task
i-deals and OCB (indirect effect = .06, bootstrap SE = .03, CI90% [.02, .12]) when controlling for
OBSE as a (significant) simultaneous mediator (indirect effect = .10, bootstrap SE = .05, CI90%
[.04, .20]). We repeated the analysis with financial i-deals as the predictor, but did not find
support for the mediating role of competence need satisfaction in the relationship between
financial i-deals and OCB (indirect effect = .02, bootstrap SE = .02, CI90% [-.003, .07]), after
accounting for OBSE as a (significant) simultaneous mediator (indirect effect = .04, bootstrap SE
= .03, CI90% [.01, .11]). Thus, H4 was again not supported.
We tested H5 using PROCESS Diagram 1, and found that task-financial i-deals
interaction was positively related to competence need satisfaction (b = .32, SE = .06, p < .001),
such that the relationship between task i-deals and competence need satisfaction was stronger
when financial i-deals were high (+1 SD) (simple slope = .88, SE = .15, t = 5.76, p < .001) versus
low (-1 SD) (simple slope = .26, SE = .11, t = 2.42, p < .05) (see Figure 4a). Therefore, H5 was
supported. While not formally hypothesized, we nonetheless tested the relationship between
task-financial i-deals interaction and OBSE and found a positive relationship (b = .26, SE = .06,
p < .001). Specifically, the relationship between task i-deals and OBSE was stronger when
financial i-deals were high (+1 SD) (simple slope = .82, SE = .13, t = 6.11, p < .001) versus low
(-1 SD) (simple slope = .31, SE = .10, t = 3.24, p < .01) (see Figure 4b).
Finally, we tested H6 using PROCESS Diagram 8, and found that competence need
satisfaction mediated the relationship between the task-financial i-deals interaction and OCB
(indirect effect = .08, bootstrap SE = .04, CI90% [.03, .15]), even when controlling for the
(significant) mediating role of OBSE (indirect effect = .10, bootstrap SE = .04, CI90% [.04, .19]).
Therefore, H6 was again supported.
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Discussion
Study 2 replicated and extended the findings of Study 1, supporting all the hypotheses
except for H2 and H4, while concurrently taking into account the self-enhancement mechanism
represented by OBSE. The results again demonstrate the competence-signaling function of task
i-deals and task-financial i-deals interaction, as well as the mediating role that this function plays
in translating these i-deals into enhanced OCB. Again, financial i-deals showed no significant
competence-signaling function. In Study 3, we attempt to replicate these findings while
simultaneously accounting for POS, so as to increase our confidence in our findings. POS,
representing the extent to which employees believe that their organization values their
contributions and cares about their well-being (Eisenberger, Huntington, Hutchison, & Sowa,
1986), reflects the quality of organization-member social exchange, which has been shown to
explain the work implications of i-deals. Study 3 also includes measures of social desirability
and a marker variable (financial impulsivity) to reduce the threat of social desirability and
common method biases to our findings.
Study 3
Methods
Participants. A different sample consisting of 125 employees recruited via the
StudyResponse Project completed the two sessions of this study (about three weeks apart), with a
retention rate of 94.7% at Time 2. Five participants had changed their organization/supervisor by
the second survey and were excluded, leaving a final sample of 120 employees (30% female),
with an average age of 37.0 years (s.d. = 7.0). All of them had at least some college education.
Measures. Participants completed the measures of i-deals, competence need satisfaction,
POS, and demographics at Time 1, and OCB, social desirability, and financial impulsivity at
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Time 2. Task i-deals (α = .72), financial i-deals (α = .72), competence need satisfaction (α = .76),
OCB (α = .85), and the control variables were assessed with the same items and rating scales
used in Study 1.
POS. Participants indicated their POS by responding to Eisenberger, Armeli, Rexwinkel,
Lynch, and Rhoades’s (2001) six items (e.g., “My organization really cares about my wellbeing”) on a five-point scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree) (α = .72).
Social desirability. To address the concern of social desirability bias associated with the
self-report items, we included Strahan and Gerbasi’s (1972) 10-item social desirability scale
(e.g., “You always try to practice what you preach”), to which participants provided true/false
dichotomous responses.
Marker variable. Siemsen et al. (2010) proposed that common method bias can be
reduced or eliminated when estimating a regression equation subject by adding a marker
variable. In selecting a marker variable, we followed Lindell and Whitney’s (2001)
recommendations that marker variables must (a) have high reliability, (b) be theoretically
unrelated to at least one of the other variables, and (c) be included in the questionnaire a priori.
Financial impulsivity, assessed by Tsukayama, Duckworth, and Kim’s (2012) six-item scale, met
all these conditions. Participants responded to the items (e.g., “buying things on impulse”) on a
five-point scale from 1 (never) to 5 (very often) (α = .86).
Results
Measurement model. We used the same approach as in Study 2 to evaluate the
measurement model. All the indicators loaded onto their respective latent variables with a factor
loading score of above |.40|, and the five-factor model fit the data reasonably well (χ2 = 146.96,
df = 67, CFI = .95, SRMR = .07, RMSEA = .09) and had a better fit than any of the four-factor
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models (Δχ2s ≥ 12.35, dfs = 4, ps < .05, ΔCFIs ≥ .01). Again, a follow-up targeted CFA further
indicated the distinctiveness of task and financial i-deals, in that the two-factor model fit the data
better than the one-factor model (Δχ2 = 4.31, df = 1, p < .05).
Hypothesis testing. Table 4 presents the descriptive statistics, correlations, and alphas
(internal consistency). As in Studies 1 and 2, the inclusion of gender, age, organizational tenure,
education, and organizational status did not change the result patterns. Additionally, the
inclusion of the social desirability and financial impulsivity variables in the path model did not
change the pattern of results. Thus, these variables were excluded from the subsequent models.
While the preliminary model fit the data moderately well (χ2 = 20.44, df = 3, GFI = .95, CFI
= .94, NFI = .93, SRMR = .07), a review of the modification indices indicated that the model fit
could be improved by adding a direct link between financial i-deals and OCB. This direct link
takes into account the possibility that financial i-deals translate into OCB through mechanisms
other than competence need satisfaction and POS. The final model, with this direct link, fit the
data better: χ2 = 3.15, df = 2, GFI = .99, CFI = 1.00, NFI = .99, SRMR = .01 (see Figure 5).
We again used the same series of PROCESS-based tests (Hayes, 2013), with 1,000replication bootstrapping, to test H1 through H6. Using PROCESS Diagram 4, we found that
task i-deals were positively related to competence need satisfaction (b = .29, SE = .12, p = .01),
supporting H1 again, as well as to POS (b = .51, SE = .09, p < .001). A separate analysis
indicated that financial i-deals were not significantly related to competence need satisfaction (b
= .14, SE = .10, p = .20), again failing to support H2, but yet were positively related to POS (b
= .41, SE = .08, p < .001).
Competence need satisfaction mediated the relationship between task i-deals and OCB
(indirect effect = .04, bootstrap SE = .03, CI90% [.002, .11]), after controlling for the (significant)
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mediating role of POS (indirect effect = .18, bootstrap SE = .08, CI90% [.07, .36]). However, as in
Studies 1 and 2, competence need satisfaction did not mediate the relationship between financial
i-deals and OCB (indirect effect = .02, bootstrap SE = .02, CI90% [-.01, .07]), when POS was
simultaneously included as a (significant) mediator (indirect effect = .12, bootstrap SE = .06,
CI90% [.05, .23]). Accordingly, H3 was again supported whereas H4 was not.
To test H5, we used PROCESS Diagram 1 and found that task-financial i-deals
interaction was positively related to competence need satisfaction (b = .32, SE = .13, p < .05),
such that the relationship between task i-deals and competence need satisfaction was stronger
when financial i-deals were high (+1 SD) (simple slope = .76, SE = .23, t = 3.37, p = .001) versus
low (-1 SD) (simple slope = .33, SE = .17, t = 1.93, p = .06) (see Figure 6). Therefore, H5 was
again supported.
Finally, using PROCESS Diagram 8, we found that competence need satisfaction
mediated the relationship between task-financial i-deals interaction and OCB (indirect effect
= .05, bootstrap SE = .03, CI90% [.02, .11]), when the (non-significant) mediating effect of POS
was simultaneously accounted for (indirect effect = .02, bootstrap SE = .06, CI90% [-.07, .12]),
thereby supporting H6.
Discussion
By replicating the findings in Studies 1 and 2, Study 3 further reinforces the notion that
task i-deals operate not only independently to signal employee competence, but also jointly with
financial i-deals when the competence signals conveyed by both forms of i-deals are consistent
with each other. Moreover, although POS mediated the relationships that task and financial ideals had with OCB, it did not mediate the relationship between task-financial i-deals interaction

I-Deals Interaction 28
and OCB. Together, these results indicate that the linkage between i-deals and OCB cannot be
solely attributed to POS.
General Discussion
Following Rousseau et al. (2006), we conceptualize i-deals as a signaling device utilized
by the employer to convey positive messages to employees. By adopting signaling theory as an
overarching framework and conducting a series of field studies, we provide several key findings.
Specifically, competence need satisfaction mediated the relationships between task i-deals and
OCB, and between task-financial i-deals interaction and OCB. However, competence need
satisfaction did not mediate the relationship between financial i-deals and OCB. These findings
suggest that i-deals operate independently as competence-signaling devices only when the
signals conveyed by the i-deals are strong (i.e., in the context of task i-deals), and also operate
jointly with other i-deals when the signals conveyed by the portfolio of i-deals are consistent.
The signaling function of task i-deals and their interaction with financial i-deals was so robust
that it remained significant even when LMX, OBSE, and POS were separately included as
alternative mediating mechanisms. These findings advance i-deals research and provide
implications for managerial practice.
Theoretical Implications
Signaling function of i-deals. The key premise of our research is that employers use ideals to send positive signals to employees and elicit favorable responses that benefit the
organization. Our research shows that this signaling view of i-deals is robust with both self- and
coworker-reported measures of OCB, and also when social exchange and self-enhancement
views are simultaneously considered. However, not all forms of i-deals are equally effective as
signaling devices. Our findings indicate that signal strength matters, in that task i-deals are
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effective in conveying positive signals regarding employees’ competence (as indicated by
employees’ enhanced competence need satisfaction), whereas financial i-deals are not. Further,
the findings support the contention in signaling theory that signal consistency determines the
strength of strong signals, such that inconsistent messages conveyed by other signals from the
same signaler can attenuate the effectiveness of strong signals. Specifically, task i-deals
exhibited a stronger positive link to competence need satisfaction when financial i-deals were at
a higher level, arguably because low levels of financial i-deals contradicted the positive signals
conveyed by task i-deals. These findings respond to Jiang and colleagues’ (2012) call for human
resource research that adopts a “synergistic logic when looking at the composition within a
single HR system [sic]” (p. 97), and also to Connelly et al.’s (2011) call for research to examine
how a portfolio of signals can be configured to maximize their combined effectiveness. In so
doing, we open up research avenues into how various forms of i-deals may be mixed and
combined so as to realize the inherent motivational and performance potential of i-deals.
Alternative functions of i-deals. Despite recent attempts by i-deals scholars (e.g., Liu et
al., 2013) to examine additional mechanisms through which i-deals facilitate behavioral
outcomes, the predominant view in the i-deals literature derives from social exchange theory
(Liao et al., in press). While the present research offers further empirical support for the
relevance of this and the self-enhancement views (Liu et al., 2013), it also goes beyond these
functions to introduce a signaling pathway, involving competence need satisfaction, through
which task i-deals operate independently and jointly with financial i-deals to facilitate OCB. This
mediating mechanism, which operates above and beyond LMX, OBSE, and POS, not only
supports Liao et al.’s (in press) contention that a social exchange view is insufficient in
explaining how i-deals operate, but also suggests that a self-enhancement view is also
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insufficient. While researchers have alluded to the signaling function of i-deals (e.g., Rousseau et
al., 2006), the current research is the first to articulate, and provide empirical evidence on, the
competence-related nature of such signals, thereby expanding the nomological network of i-deals
and addressing researchers’ call for “broaden[ing] the explanatory framework by investigating
other mechanisms known to operate in employment relationships” (Liao et al., in press, p. 29).
Financial i-deals. The distinctive signaling strength of task i-deals relative to financial ideals suggests that i-deals are non-monolithic and may not have identical relationships with
employee outcomes. The current research delineates the distinctive nature of financial i-deals,
which have not received as much research attention as other forms of i-deals. Specifically, we
found that competence need satisfaction did not translate financial i-deals into enhanced OCB,
thereby suggesting that financial i-deals, by themselves, convey weak or ineffective competencerelated signals to employees. This is in line with SDT arguments that extrinsic incentives may
serve opposing (informational versus controlling) functions that potentially counteract each
other. Instead, LMX, OBSE, and POS separately mediated the relationship between financial ideals and OCB, supporting extant social exchange and self-enhancement views of i-deals and
suggesting that financial i-deals may operate through non-competence-related mechanisms to
enhance employees’ discretionary behaviors.
More broadly, our present findings do not preclude the possibility that i-deals can convey
other signals beside work competence, thereby presenting opportunities for future research.
Further, while previous studies have documented inconsistent and contradictory evidence on
whether financial i-deals elicit positive outcomes from employees, the current findings are more
aligned with Ho and Tekleab’s (2013) findings of positive attitudinal implications of financial ideals than with the null and negative attitudinal implications reported by Rosen et al. (2013).
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Thus, these findings offer further evidence that financial i-deals can indeed have positive
implications for employee outcomes.
Practical Implications
Our findings demonstrate the organizational benefits that derive from granting task and
financial i-deals, and provide another avenue through which employers can pursue to promote
OCB. Compared to other forms of i-deals that are more easily observed by coworkers and, in
turn, may engender social comparison and feelings of inequity or demoralization among others
(Rousseau et al., 2006), financial i-deals are less observable because of pay secrecy practices
(e.g., Belogolovsky & Bamberger, 2014). As such, financial i-deals may constitute a viable way
for organizations to reward star performers without triggering negative third-party reactions. By
demonstrating that different forms of i-deals can interact with each other to alter signal strength
in eliciting positive employee responses, our research also underscores the broader implication
that organizations should pay attention to the entire portfolio of different forms of i-deals, rather
than each in isolation, in order to send consistent, reinforcing signals that yield beneficial
outcomes.
Limitations and Directions for Future Research
Although our three field studies used varying measures, thereby complementing and
addressing key limitations inherent in each, all variables in Studies 2 and 3 were self-reported,
raising concerns about common-method and common-source bias. However, i-deals researchers
have noted that employees, compared to supervisors and other organizational agents, are
arguably the most knowledgeable about the i-deals they negotiate with different organizational
representatives (Liao et al., in press). Additionally, the fact that the pattern of results in Study 1,
where OCB was coworker-rated, was replicated in Studies 2 and 3 renders strong confidence in
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our findings. Also of note is that interactive relationships cannot be inflated by common method
bias (Conway & Lance 2010; Evans 1985; Siemsen et al., 2010), thereby further evincing that
this bias was an unlikely threat to our findings.
Another limitation is that we cannot draw causal conclusions from the findings with full
confidence, even though we collected data at two time points in all three studies. While we
expected i-deals to drive employees’ competence need satisfaction and, in turn, OCB, and
collected data matching this hypothesized sequence, the practical constraints of obtaining an
adequate sample size necessitated a small temporal gap between Time 1 and Time 2. As such,
this prevented us from making firm conclusions on the predicted direction of causality.
Notwithstanding these limitations, our research provides several directions for future
research. First, the signaling view of i-deals can be extended to other forms of i-deals. For
instance, developmental i-deals focusing on opportunities to develop work competence may also
convey competence-related messages, whereas flexibility i-deals may be less effective. Other
signals conveyed by i-deals, beyond one’s competence, are also worth investigating in order to
provide a more comprehensive and nuanced view of the signaling function that i-deals play.
Future research can also continue the inquiry on the interactive roles of i-deals on employee
outcomes to investigate how multiple forms of i-deals can operate jointly. Other related
questions are whether receiving multiple forms of i-deals can exhibit a too-much-of-a-good-thing
phenomenon (Pierce & Aguinis, 2013), and whether granting multiple forms of i-deals to a
single employee may intensify coworkers’ perception of unfairness (Greenberg, Roberge, Ho, &
Rousseau, 2004).
Conclusion
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We set out to examine the signaling function of task i-deals, financial i-deals, and their
interaction. We adopted signaling theory as the overarching framework and integrated SDT to
examine how task and financial i-deals independently and jointly predict OCB via competence
need satisfaction. The findings, replicated across three field studies, indicate that task i-deals,
independently and jointly with financial i-deals, send positive, competence-related signals to
motivate employee OCB, and that this signaling function is robust even after accounting for the
alternative mechanisms of social exchange (LMX and POS) and self-enhancement (OBSE). On
the other hand, competence need satisfaction did not mediate the relationship between financial
i-deals and OCB, whereas LMX, OBSE, and POS separately mediated this relationship. Overall,
by demonstrating the signaling function of i-deals and highlighting the benefits of granting task
i-deals independently and jointly with financial i-deals, the current research advances both
research and practice of i-deals.
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Footnote
1

While pay-for-performance and merit pay practices share some similarities with

financial i-deals, they are nonetheless distinct. I-deals are, by definition, (i) individually
negotiated between an employee and the employee; and (ii) heterogeneous such that the terms
are customized to the individual. In contrast, merit pay and pay-for-performance practices are
generally part of an organization’s standard compensation design (not individually negotiated),
and all employees in the same position or group can receive the same set of terms and conditions
(not heterogeneous). Additionally, the nature of financial i-deals goes beyond simply increasing
base pay or bonus according to one’s performance, as is typical in pay-for-performance and
merit pay plans. Instead, financial i-deals can include different combinations of various financial
incentives to suit the individual’s needs, such as changing the configuration of salary and
benefits, or combining different types of benefits such as health insurance and tuition
reimbursement according to one’s preferences. Accordingly, despite the fact that all these
practices relate to financial incentives, the idiosyncratic nature of financial i-deals sets it apart
from the other more conventional and standardized forms of financial incentive systems.
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Table 1. Hypotheses and Results across Three Studies
Hypotheses
H1: Task i-deals → competence need satisfaction
H2: Financial i-deals → competence need satisfaction
H3: Task i-deals → competence need satisfaction → OCB
H4: Financial i-deals → competence need satisfaction → OCB

Study 1

Study 2

Study 3

Supported

Supported

Supported

Not supported Not supported Not supported
Supported

Supported

Supported

Not supported Not supported Not supported

H5: Task i-deals × financial i-deals → competence need satisfaction

Supported

Supported

Supported

H6: Task i-deals × financial i-deals → competence need satisfaction → OCB

Supported

Supported

Supported
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Table 2. Descriptive Statistics and Correlations (Study 1)
Variable

M

SD

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

1. Task i-deals (T1)

5.28

1.00

(.89)

2. Financial i-deals (T1)

4.90

1.38

.77***

(.92)

3. Competence need satisfaction (T2)

6.03

.90

.35***

.12

(.90)

4. LMX (T2)

5.56

.87

.57***

.34***

.62***

(.91)

5. Coworker-rated OCB (T2)

5.76

.88

.58***

.37***

.66***

.74***

(.96)

6. Coworker-rated task performance (T2)

5.99

1.02

.33***

.16

.60***

.52***

.56***

(.89)

7. Gender (T1)

.27

.45

-.14

-.33***

.14

.12

.07

.04

8. Age (T1)

41.70

10.46

-.01

-.14

.09

.21*

.15

.13

.08

9. Tenure (T1)

152.47 736.75

.04

.01

.01

.06

.07

.11

.15

.23**

9

10. Education (T1)

.79

.41

.16

.40***

-.15

-.10

-.12

-.15

-.28***

-.38***

.02

11. Organizational status (T1)

2.81

.97

.18*

.23**

.02

.15

.12

.09

-.09

.34***

.13

Note. N = 131. Alphas (internal consistency) are presented in the parentheses. T1 represents Time 1 and T2 represents Time 2. * p
< .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001.

10

.15
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Table 3. Descriptive Statistics and Correlations (Study 2)
Variable

M

SD

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1. Task i-deals (T1)

3.64

.79

(.87)

2. Financial i-deals (T1)

3.28

.98

.76***

(.91)

3. Competence need satisfaction (T1)

3.95

.67

.26**

.13

(.79)

4. OBSE (T1)

4.05

.60

.34***

.18

.67***

5. OCB (T2)

3.78

.61

.38*** .33*** .58*** .62*** (.92)

6. Gender (T1)

.49

.50

-.07

-.05

.13

.16

.05

7. Age (T1)

34.33 6.90

-.08

.04

.19*

.01

.20*

.05

8. Tenure (T1)

5.53

4.09

.13

.07

.24*

.08

.13

.17

.60***

9. Education (T1)

.94

.24

.02

-.05

.24*

.14

.17

.10

.08

10. Organizational status (T1)

2.41

.86

-.03

.02

-.02

-.08

-.02

-

8

9

(.88)

.20*

.39*** .38***

.04

.28**
Note. N = 116. Alphas (internal consistency) are presented in the parentheses. T1 represents Time 1 and T2 represents Time 2. * p
< .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001.
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Table 4. Descriptive Statistics and Correlations (Study 3)
Variable

M

SD

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

1. Task i-deals (T1)

3.75

.59

(.72)

2. Financial i-deals (T1)

3.62

.67

.73***

(.72)

3. POS (T1)

3.72

.64

.47***

.43***

(.72)

4. Competence need satisfaction (T1)

5.74

.77

.22*

.12

.41***

5. OCB (T2)

3.92

.46

.41***

.51***

6. Social desirability (T2)

5.70

2.14

-.01

-.01

7. Financial impulsivity (T2)

2.61

.70

.06

.13

-.19*

-.12

-.13

8. Gender (T1)

.30

.46

-.22*

-.29***

-.13

.04

-.07

.01

-.06

9. Age (T1)

37.00

7.03

-.13

-.27**

.09

.06

.03

-.02

-.05

.21*

10. Tenure (T1)

6.83

3.09

.09

.04

.13

.32***

.13

.18

.04

-.09

.21*

11. Education (T1)

.93

.26

.43***

.59***

.39***

.08

.32***

-.06

.11

-.09

-.23*

12. Organizational status (T1)

2.33

.85

-.04

-.001

.02

.12

.02

-.001

.13

.24**

.21*

10

11

(.76)

.65*** .46***

(.85)

.29*** .30*** .37***
-.30*** (.86)

-.09
.29*** .04

Note. N = 120. Alphas (internal consistency) are presented in the parentheses. T1 represents Time 1 and T2 represents Time 2. * p
< .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001.
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LMX (T2)

Task I-Deals (T1)

.79***
.69***

-.22*

.54***
.16*

Coworker-rated OCB
(T2)

Financial I-Deals (T1)

.32***

-.35**

Task I-Deals ×
Financial I-Deals (T1)

.21*

Competence Need
Satisfaction (T2)

Figure 1. Final path model (Study 1). Notes. χ2(3) = 14.16, GFI = .97, CFI = .97, NFI = .97, SRMR = .05. The covariance of the
disturbance terms of LMX and competence need satisfaction (cov = .28, SE = .05, p < .001) was modeled but is not presented for the
sake of presentation clarity. Standardized path coefficients are presented. LMX represents leader-member exchange. OCB represents
organizational citizenship behaviors. T1 represents Time 1 and T2 represents Time 2.
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(a)
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5
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high task i-deals

Figure 2. Financial i-deals as a moderator in the relationships between (a) task i-deals and
competence need satisfaction; and (b) task i-deals and LMX (Study 1).
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Task I-Deals (T1)

OBSE (T1)

.74***
-.28*
.43***

.42***

Financial I-Deals (T1)

OCB (T2)

.30***

.67***

Task I-Deals ×
Financial I-Deals (T1)

-.27*
.46***

Competence Need
Satisfaction (T1)

Figure 3. Final path model (Study 2). Notes. χ2(3) = .11.43, GFI = .97, CFI = .97, NFI = .96, SRMR = .06. The covariance of the
disturbance terms of OBSE and competence need satisfaction (cov = .16, SE = .03, p < .001) was modeled but is not presented for the
sake of presentation clarity. Standardized path coefficients are presented. OBSE represents organization-based self-esteem. OCB
represents organizational citizenship behaviors. T1 represents Time 1 and T2 represents Time 2.
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(a)

Competence need
satisfaction

5
low financial i-deals
4
high financial i-deals

3
2
low task i-deals

high task i-deals

(b)
5
low financial i-deals

OBSE

4

high financial i-deals

3
2
low task i-deals

high task i-deals

Figure 4. Financial i-deals as a moderator in the relationships between (a) task i-deals and
competence need satisfaction and (c) task i-deals and OBSE (Study 2).
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Task I-Deals (T1)

POS (T1)

.36**
.20

.42***
.07

Financial I-Deals (T1)

OCB (T2)
.30***

.42***

.25***

-.04

Task I-Deals ×
Financial I-Deals (T1)

.28*

Competence Need
Satisfaction (T1)

Figure 5. Final path model (Study 3). Notes. χ2(2) = 3.15, GFI = .99, CFI = 1.00, NFI = .99, SRMR = .01. The covariance of the
disturbance terms of OBSE and competence need satisfaction (cov = .15, SE = .04, p < .001) was modeled but is not presented for the
sake of presentation clarity. Standardized path coefficients are presented. The solid lines represent the significant paths whereas the
dotted lines represent the non-significant paths. POS represents perceived organizational support. OCB represents organizational
citizenship behaviors. T1 represents Time 1 and T2 represents Time 2.
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7
low financial i-deals
6
high financial i-deals
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Figure 6. Financial i-deals as a moderator in the relationship between task i-deals and
competence need satisfaction (Study 3).

